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How Meaningful Is a Close Relationship? When it Comes to Insider Trading Prosecution,
the Second Circuit Says “Not Very”
*Timothy J. Paulson
I.

Introduction

On August 23, 2017, the Second Circuit upheld the securities fraud conviction of S.A.C. Capital
Advisors LLC (“SAC”) portfolio manager Mathew Martoma in connection to an insider trading scheme
concerning securities of pharmaceutical companies Elan Corporation, plc and Wyeth.1 Involving over $275
million, the government publicly described Mr. Martoma’s insider trading scheme as the “most lucrative” in
history, “on a scale that has no historical precedent.”2 Between 2006 and 2008, Martoma frequently consulted
with doctors from Elan and Wyeth throughout the corporations’ joint development of an Alzheimer’s
treatment.3 At these meetings, Mr. Martoma often received nonpublic information while paying up to $1,500
an hour in consulting fees, despite a provision in the consulting agreement prohibiting the exchange of such
information.4 After a phone conversation with Dr. Sidney Gilman on July 17, 2008, the chair of the safety
monitoring committee for the clinical trial, Mr. Martoma, flew to Michigan to meet Gilman in person on July
19, 2008.5 Two days later, Martoma induced SAC to significantly reduce its positions in both Elan and
Wyeth.6
On July 29, 2008, Dr. Gilman publicly presented the clinical trial’s undesirable final results for the
first time at the International Conference on Alzheimer’s Disease, prompting Elan and Wyeth’s share prices
to decline by 42% and 12%, respectively.7 After the stocks plummeted, SAC’s July 21 position resulted in
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capital gains of approximately $80.3 million and averted losses of approximately $194.6 million.8 Martoma
received a $9 million bonus based largely on his involvement with the transaction.9
Despite the ease with which the court could have convicted Martoma using firmly established insider
trading liability principles, the Second Circuit majority focused on a contentious liability theory that has
troubled appellate courts for the past five years.10 Writing for the Martoma majority, Chief Judge Katzman
rearticulated the personal benefit rule, a component of the fourth prong in the test for “tipper-tippee” insider
trading liability, established by Justice Powell in Dirk v. S.E.C. in 1983;11 more specifically, Chief Judge
Katzman attempted to clarify when, if ever, a personal benefit may be inferred in the exchange of material,
nonpublic, corporate information.12This Comment will discuss why the Martoma majority’s interpretation of
when a personal benefit may be inferred under “tipper-tippee” insider trading liability was both unnecessary
and inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, it will examine the evolution of the personal
benefit rule, its importance, and how the Second Circuit’s cannibalization of the rule may create insider trading
liability for noncriminal market analysis. Part II of this Comment describes the creation and early
development of United States insider trading laws, as well as the public policy rationale for prohibiting trading
on material nonpublic information. Part II begins with the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and highlights
landmark decisions in insider trading jurisprudence through 1968. Part III of this Comment explores the
genesis of “tipper-tippee” liability and the personal benefit rule. Part III starts with the 1980 Supreme Court
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case that first acknowledged insider trading liability imposed by tipping. It then examines Justice Powell’s
conception of the modern “tipper-tippee” framework established in Dirks. Part IV will detail how the
inconsistent application of Dirks in the Federal Circuit culminated in the 2016 Supreme Court case Salman v.
United States. It will also dissect the Second Circuit majority’s application of Dirks in Martoma, in light of
the recent Supreme Court decision. Part V will illustrate why Judge Pooler’s interpretation of the tipper-tippee
liability correctly outlines the Supreme Court’s intentions in Salman and the options to reconcile the Martoma
decision going forward. Finally, Part VI will conclude by arguing the Second Circuit needs to clarify the
proper application of Dirks and the legislature should step in and create statutory guidelines for insider trading
prosecution. In its entirety, this Comment will argue that the Martoma majority unduly tilted insider trading
prosecution in the government’s favor by disabling Dirks’ personal benefit requirement and potentially
criminalizing behavior vital to market efficiency.
II.

Motivation, Creation, and Early Development of United States Insider Trading Laws

Insider trading is defined as the buying and selling of a security by someone who has access to
material nonpublic information about the security,13 and the American public considered it wrong for over a
century.14 In the early 1900’s, the Supreme Court noted the inherent deception in a corporate director
purchasing shares from an outside shareholder based on material information only a director could know.15
Since then, the government and other securities experts have proffered numerous motivations behind insider
trading prohibition. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) supports prioritizing
the prosecution of insider trading violations to preserve “investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of
the securities markets.”16 An independent study from Duke University suggests the enforcement of insider
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trading regulations decreases the cost of equity by up to five percent.17 There is one overarching principle
behind arguments supporting insider trading prohibition: if a country wants consumers to invest their wealth
in its securities market, the public must be confident it is getting a fair chance of earning a return. Investors
may be reluctant to put their money into a market that gives corporate insiders, or those close to insiders, a
better chance at capital growth. The general motivation behind insider trading laws, and virtually all securities
laws, may be attributed to the government’s interest in encouraging investing by maintaining a healthy
securities market.
A.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Birth of American Insider Trading Law
The Supreme Court planted the seed of United States insider trading regulations over 100 years ago

when it held corporate directors have a duty to disclose nonpublic material information when trading with
shareholders on that information, or must abstain from trading on it all together.18 The 1909 Supreme Court’s
decision in Strong v. Repide made it undoubtedly clear that a director cannot trade on privileged information
obtained through his or her status as an insider, but left it equally unclear who qualifies as an “insider.”19 That
question remained unanswered twenty-five years later, after the next major development in insider trading
law— the passing of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act).20
Since the inception of the Exchange Act, courts have struggled to precisely define what actions
constitute insider trading.21 This is, in part, because the Exchange Act itself makes no reference to trading on
privileged information.22 Despite never mentioning the phrase “insider trading,” section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, serve as the statutory basis for almost all modern

17

Uptal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. & ECON., 75, 75–108 (2002).
See Strong, 213 U.S. at 432.
19
Id.
20
15 U.S.C. § 78a (2016).
21
For an overview of the development of insider trading regulation, see Donald C. Langevoort, ‘‘Fine Distinctions” in the
Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429.
22
See 15 U.S.C. § 78a–kk (2016).
18

4

insider trading convictions.23 Promulgated under the catch-all anti-fraud provision in section 10(b), Rule 10b5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange . . . [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.24
Because most federal insider trading liability theories derive from this all-encompassing ban on fraud
and deceit, the lack of legislative guidance has forced judges to create a standard for prosecution entirely
through adjudication.
B.

Early Application of Rule 10b-5
In a 1961 case of first impression and “signal importance in [the] administration of the Federal

securities acts,” the SEC laid the foundation for applying Rule 10b-5 to insider trading cases.25 Cady, Robert
& Co. involved a director of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, a publicly traded company, who told his
associate at a registered broker-dealer firm that Curtiss-Wright planned to reduce its quarterly dividend.26
Upon learning this information, the brokerage associate unloaded 7,000 shares of Curtiss-Wright stock before
news of the dividend went public.27 The SEC found respondents in violation of both section 17(a) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, stating the “anti-fraud provisions are not intended as a specification of
particular acts or practices which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass the infinite variety of
devices by which undue advantage may be taken of investors and others.”28 More importantly, the SEC
provided a test to determine when an insider has an affirmative duty to disclose or abstain from trading on
nonpublic material information under Rule 10b-5.29 The Commission explained the duty of an insider does
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not arise from his or her status within a corporation, but rests on two elements: (1) “the existence of a
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,” and (2) “the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.”30 The SEC
held insiders and their associates owe this duty to both existing stockholders and traders in the open market.31
This decision marked a turning point in insider trading jurisprudence and served as a base for future regulatory
developments.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the SEC’s “abstain or disclose” rule, under Rule 10b5, in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.32 The Texas Gulf court held anyone who
possesses “material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from
disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading
in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.”33 Texas
Gulf was vital to insider trading jurisprudence because it created binding precedent in the Second Circuit and
articulated a workable standard for applying Rule 10b-5 to trades based on nonpublic material information.
These interpretations of Rule 10b-5 created the initial precedent for prosecuting insider trading cases by
establishing the duty to disclose or abstain, conferring that duty on anyone in possession of nonpublic material
information, and expanding it to include both trading in and recommending subject securities.34
III.

Tipper-Tippee Liability and the Personal Benefit Rule

After Texas Sulphur, insider trading jurisprudence remained fairly stagnant through the 1970’s. It
was only after the Supreme Court limited the application of Rule 10b-5 did the roots for modern tipper-tippee
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liability begin to sprout.35 After the court reduced the standard established by Texas Sulphur, the government
was forced to find new ways to prosecute individuals trading on nonpublic material information.36 Chiarella
v. United States and the cases that followed illustrate the shrinking of insider trading liability and the
government’s attempts to tilt the standard back in the prosecution’s favor.37
A.

Chiarella v. United States
In 1980, in one of the two most widely cited insider trading cases, the Supreme Court was tasked with

determining the extent and reach of the duties and liabilities under Rule 10b-5.38 In both Cady and Texas
Sulphur, liability under Rule 10b-5 was said to be created by the “inherent unfairness” of insiders trading on
privileged information.39 When Justice Powell was faced with deciding whether a financial printer violated
section 10(b) in Chiarella v. United States, he decided “unfairness” alone was insufficient to support a
conviction.40
At the time of his arrest, Vincent Chiarella was an employee for a company tasked with printing
corporate takeover bids.41 The SEC investigated and charged Chiarella under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
after he netted over $30,000 in fourteen months trading on privileged information obtained while printing
confidential documents.42 Chiarella is distinguishable from all aforementioned insider trading cases because
the defendant was charged under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 even though he is not a corporate insider and
did not receive any confidential information from the subject company.43 Because of this, the Court had to
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decide when and how an individual with no connection to the subject company may be found guilty of insider
trading.44
Writing for the Chiarella majority, Justice Powell looked to the language of Rule 10b-5 to emphasize
two defects in the appellate court’s reasoning behind convicting Chiarella.45 First, Justice Powell noted the
“disclose or abstain” rule’s improper reliance on fairness.46 Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit fraudulent
activity, not unfairness, and “not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under
[section] 10(b).”47 The second defect Justice Powell found in Chiarella’s conviction was the absence of a
duty to disclose the subject information.48 The defendant was not an agent, fiduciary, or even an acquaintance
of the subject company.49 Justice Powell proclaimed affirming his conviction would be recognizing a
“general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic
information,” and a “formulation of such a broad duty . . . should not be undertaken absent some explicit
evidence of congressional intent.”50
Justice Powell’s opinion in Chiarella significantly reduced insider trading liability by holding
previous applications of Rule 10b-5 too broad.51 Although Rule 10b-5 is designed as a “catch-all” provision,
it is designed to encompass all instances of fraud, not unfairness.52 Despite citing a lack of fiduciary duty to
disclose as a reason for reversing Chiarella’s conviction, Justice Powell declined to speculate upon what
elements may impress such a duty on an “outsider,” only that a duty is necessary and does not exist between
all participants in market transactions.53 Three years later, in the second of the two most widely cited insider
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trading cases, Justice Powell was given the chance to clarify when an “outsider” has a duty imposing liability
under Rule 10b-5.54
B.

Dirks v. United States: The Introduction of the Personal Benefit Rule
Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Dirks v. S.E.C. provided a formula for prosecuting insider trading

violations that governs to this day.55 Raymond Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer firm who
provided investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors.56 Dirks learned from
Robert Secrist, a former officer of an insurance company, that the company’s finances were severely
overstated due to fraudulent corporate practices.57 Secrist asked Dirks to verify the fraud and disclose it
publicly.58 Dirks found Secrist’s claims to be true, and, throughout his investigation, he discussed these
findings with various clients and investors.59 Although Dirks did hold any stock in the subject company,
many of the people he spoke with did; five of whom liquidated over $16 million worth of shares in the
company.60 Two weeks into Dirks’ investigation, the company’s stock price dropped from $26 to less than
$15 per share, California insurance authorities impounded its records, and the SEC filed a complaint against
it.61
The SEC’s investigation led to Dirks appearing at a hearing in front of an administrative law judge.62
At the hearing, the SEC found him guilty of aiding and abetting insider trading violations, concluding: “Where
‘tippees’—regardless of their motivation or occupation—come into possession of material ‘information that
they know is confidential and know or should know came from a corporate insider,’ they must either publicly
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disclose that information or refrain from trading.”63 Dirks sought review by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, which entered judgment against him in reliance on the SEC’s original opinion.64 The
Supreme Court then granted certiorari due to the importance of the question presented.65
When Justice Powell was first presented with the facts of Dirks, he considered the case “easy to
decide” based on Chiarella’s fiduciary duty requirement for imposing insider trading liability.66 In a
memorandum to his colleagues, Justice Powell explained the court must determine the source, in this case
Secrist, breached a fiduciary duty in order to find that a “participant after the fact,” like Dirks, has the requisite
duty.67 Justice Powell could have swiftly exonerated Dirks under this simple analysis, as the SEC conceded
there was no breach by Secrist, but the Justice felt “deciding this case without identifying a general principle
would accomplish very little.”68 With establishing a long-term solution in mind, Justice Powell set out to
create a standard for deciding subsequent cases involving outsiders trading on nonpublic material
information.69
Justice Powell considered himself the Supreme Court’s leader in securities law at the time, thus the
most equipped for establishing a law involving the securities market.70 His major concern in sculpting what
would become known as the “Dirks test” was protecting the exchange of information necessary for the health
of the securities market.71 In its original opinion, the SEC acknowledged the undeniable importance of
allowing analysts to seek out generally unknown corporate information so their clients can benefit by trading
on that information.72 Justice Powell explained that sustaining the SEC’s decision to convict Dirks would
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dissuade analysts from continuing this practice out of fear of lawsuits decided by juries determining whether
a particular piece of information is legally disclosable. 73
Seeking to preserve the function of analysts without encouraging insiders to exploit their positions
through tipping, Justice Powell began drafting the Dirks test.74 After multiple attempts, Justice Powell and
his clerk forged the standard for establishing tipper-tippee liability and introduced the “personal benefit
rule.”75 Reversing the appellate court’s decision to convict Dirks, Justice Powell, writing for the Supreme
Court majority, held that convicting a tipper under Rule 10b-5 requires proof that: (1) the tipper had a fiduciary
duty to keep the information in question a secret, but did not, (2) the tipper knew, or should have known, the
tippee would trade on the information, and (3) the tipper received a direct or indirect personal benefit from the
disclosure.76 The personal benefit requirement may be satisfied by evidence of a quid pro quo exchange,77
an exchange for a reputational benefit, or inferred when an insider gifts confidential information to a “trading
relative or friend.”78 If these elements are satisfied, the tippee inherits the insider’s fiduciary duty to disclose
or abstain and may be found liable under Rule 10b-5.79 Justice Powell then acknowledged “determining
whether an insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be easy
for courts.”80 It is very unlikely Justice Powell knew how difficult answering that question of fact would
prove in future cases; appellate court judges have been arguing over what constitutes a personal benefit for
decades and continue to do so.
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IV.

Applying the Dirks Test in the Twenty-First Century

There were not many major developments in tipper-tippee liability insider trading cases in the years
following Dirks.81 The next watershed moment in its jurisprudence did not come until 2014, when the Second
Circuit issued its highly controversial decision in United States v. Newman.82
A.

Newman’s Close Personal Relationship Requirement
Todd Newman was a portfolio manager at Diamondback Capital Management, LLC

(“Diamondback”) who was charged under Rule 10b-5 for allegedly participating in an insider trading
scheme.83 The government alleged a group of analysts from multiple hedge funds and investment funds
obtained material nonpublic information from employees of NVIDIA and Dell, shared it with each other, then
passed it along to portfolio managers at their respective companies.84 Newman was one of those portfolio
managers, and he was accused of executing trades based on information illegally obtained through the tipping
chains.85
The tipping chains the government accused Newman of participating in were elongated and
convoluted.86 The Dell tipping chain began with a member of Dell’s investor relations department who tipped
nonpublic material information to an analyst friend.87 The analyst then shared this information with
Diamondback analyst, Jesse Tortora, who passed the information along to Newman, leaving Newman three

81
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levels removed from the Dell inside tipper.88 The NVIDIA tipping chain began with a member of NVIDIA’s
finance unit who tipped inside information to a friend.89 The friend then shared the information with an
analyst who passed it along to Jesse Tortora, and Tortora subsequently passed the information along to
Newman, leaving Newman four levels removed from the NVIDIA inside tipper.90
Although the government had not criminally charged either inside tipper at the time of Newman’s
trial, Newman was found criminally liable because “as [a] sophisticated [trader,] he should have known that
information was disclosed by insiders in a breach of fiduciary duty, and not for any legitimate corporate
purpose.”91 At trial, Newman argued there was no evidence the tippers received a personal benefit for the
information, and, even if they had, there was no evidence Newman knew about such a benefit.92 Despite this,
the district court failed to instruct the jury on the scienter requirement93 for all of the elements in the Dirks test,
and Newman was found guilty on all counts.94
On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed the jury instruction to determine whether the jury was misled
or inadequately informed on the standard for tipper-tippee liability.95 Judge Barrington, writing for the Second
Circuit majority, cited Dirks for the applicable law.96 The Judge stated because a tipper’s breach of fiduciary
duty requires a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, a tippee may not be held liable if there
is no benefit.97 A tippee may only be found liable when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty and the
tippee knows or should know there was a breach.98 Because a tipper breaches his fiduciary duty only if he
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personally benefits, and a tippee must have knowledge of the breach to inherit liability, it naturally follows
that the government cannot meet its burden of showing the tippee knew of a breach without establishing the
tippee had knowledge of the insider’s personal benefit.99
After establishing a defendant cannot be guilty under a tipper-tippee theory without knowledge of the
insider’s personal benefit, the court went on to discuss its interpretation of the Dirks test in detail.100
Summarizing the applied standard, the court held in order to sustain an insider trading conviction against a
tippee, the Government must prove: (1) the corporate insider was trusted with a fiduciary duty; (2) the
corporate insider breached that fiduciary duty by (a) disclosing confidential information to a tippee (b) in
exchange for a personal benefit; (3) the tippee knew about the tipper’s breach, meaning he knew the
confidential information was divulged for a personal benefit; and (4) the tippee used that information to trade
in a security or tip another individual for personal benefit.101 Had the court stopped there, the Newman
decision may not have stirred up the amount of controversy that it did.
After offering a detailed interpretation of the Dirks test, the court then examined the sufficiency of the
evidence against Newman, specifically whether the circumstances warranted an inference of a personal
benefit.102 Judge Barrington quoted a case broadly defining personal benefit “ ‘to include not only pecuniary
gain, but also, inter alia, any reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings and the benefit one
would obtain from simply making a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.’ ”103 The
judge then recited details of the relationships within both tipping chains.104 The Dell insider and his initial
tippee had known each other for years, attended the same business school, and previously worked at Dell
together.105 The tipper also sought career advice from the tippee in the past, sent him his resume for review,
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and consulted him regarding the qualifying exam for becoming a financial analyst.106 The NVIDIA tipper
and his initial tippee were “family friends” who met at church and occasionally socialized together.107 Judge
Barrington abruptly dismissed the idea that these relationships could be enough to infer a personal benefit,
exclaiming, “[i]f this was a ‘benefit,’ practically anything would qualify.”108
After adamantly rejecting the possibility of an inferred personal benefit, Judge Barrington attempted
to clarify the requirements for such an inference under the Dirks test.109 Referencing Justice Powell’s
language from Dirks that suggests a personal benefit may be inferred when the tippee’s “trades resemble
trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient,” the court held that a personal
benefit cannot be inferred “without proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an
exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly
valuable nature.”110
There was significant backlash inspired by Newman’s exoneration, specifically against the
requirement of a “meaningfully close personal relationship” and a pecuniary gain to infer a personal benefit.111
Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr. filed a petition claiming the decision would “hurt market participants,
disadvantage scrupulous market analysts, and impair the government’s ability to protect the fairness and
integrity of the securities markets.”112 Verrilli’s concerns were widely shared among government officials
who feared the decision would make prosecuting future insider trading violations extremely difficult.113 SEC
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spokesman John Nestor publicly labeled the decision irreconcilable with controlling Supreme Court
precedent.114 Thankfully, a case was developing in California that would provide an opportunity to revisit
the issues presented in Newman.115
B.

Salman v. United States
At the time of the trades relevant to Bassam Salman’s arrest, his brother-in-law, Maher Kara was an

investment banker in Citigroup’s healthcare investment banking group.116 While working at Citigroup,
Maher began sharing inside information about pending mergers and acquisitions with his brother, Michael.117
Michael traded on the information and shared it with others, including Salman.118 By the time the authorities
realized what was happening, Salman realized gains of over $1.5 million from trading on the tips originating
from Maher.119
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California indicted Salman on insider
trading charges in 2011, and Salman’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit was pending when Newman was
decided.120 The Ninth Circuit upheld Salman’s conviction on appeal.121 The court declined to follow
Newman’s “meaningfully close personal relationship” and pecuniary value requirements, holding that the
Salman tipper inferably received a personal benefit by making a gift of confidential information to a trading
relative.122 Due to the criticism following the Newman decision and the resultant circuit split, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in 2016 “to resolve the tension” over the proper application of the Dirks test.123
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In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Salman argued the Ninth Circuit erred by inferring Maher
received a personal benefit without evidence Maher received anything of “a pecuniary or similarly valuable
nature” in exchange for sharing the inside information with Michael.124 The Government argued that “a gift
of confidential information to anyone, not just a ‘trading relative or friend,’ is enough to prove securities
fraud.”125 The Supreme Court ultimately found Salman guilty while rejecting both arguments and overruling
part of the Newman holding in the process.126
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito looked to Dirks to resolve the “narrow issue” presented.127
Quoting Dirks, Justice Alito explained the test for insider trading liability:
whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Thus,
the disclosure of confidential information without personal benefit is not enough. In
determining whether a tipper derived a personal benefit, we instructed courts to ‘focus on
objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from
the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future
earnings.’ . . . This personal benefit can ‘often’ be inferred ‘from objective facts and
circumstances,’ we explained, such as ‘a relationship between the insider and the recipient
that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient.’
. . . ‘The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist
when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.’ In
such cases, ‘[t]he tip and trade resemble trading by the insider followed by a gift of the profits
to the recipient.’128
Justice Alito emphasized the language from Dirks that imposes liability for gifts of confidential
information to “trading relative[s] or friend[s].”129 Justice Alito then declared that a portion of the test resolves
the case at hand because it “makes clear” that an insider gifting confidential information to a “trading relative”
breaches a fiduciary duty.130 After affirming the appellate court’s decision to convict Salman, the Justice went
on to expressly overrule a portion of Newman, holding “to the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper
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must also receive something of ‘a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or
friends, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.”131
Throughout the Salman opinion, Justice Alito reiterated the fact Maher and Michael were brothers
clearly inferred a personal benefit under Dirks.132 To further stress the holding was not intended to bind all
cases involving an inferred personal benefit, the Justice clarified that determining whether a personal benefit
exists is still a question of fact that “will not always be easy,” but did not address potential difficulties at that
time “because [Salman] involve[d] ‘precisely the gift of confidential information to a trading relative’ that Dirks
envisioned.”133

The tension surrounding the application of the Dirks standard the Supreme Court set out to resolve
did not remain settled very long. Just eight months after the Supreme Court decided Salman, the Second
Circuit issued its opinion in Martoma and relit the controversy surrounding the personal benefit rule.134
C.

The Majority Opinion in Martoma v. United States
The summary of Martoma discussed earlier provides a bird’s-eye-view of the events leading up to

Martoma’s conviction.135 The facts discovered at trial established that Martoma regularly met with multiple
doctor insiders from both companies throughout their development of the Alzheimer’s treatment.136 There
is proof that Martoma met with Dr. Gilman, the insider who tipped him the material information at issue,
around forty-three times at a $1,000 per hour rate.137 Dr. Gilman’s role in the clinical trial’s safety monitoring
committee created an obligation for him to keep the results of the trial confidential.138 Despite this, and
knowing Martoma was a portfolio manager, Dr. Gilman scheduled his consultations with Martoma around
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the trial’s safety monitoring committee meetings, allowing him to share confidential updates on the drug’s
safety without delay.139 The July 19, 2008 consultation, in which Gilman told Martoma the drug was not as
effective as expected, occurred just three days after Gilman himself learned of the drug’s efficacy issues.140
Dr. Gilman specifically did not bill for the two consultations that led to Martoma’s charges because as Dr.
Gilman provided at trial, that “would [have been] tantamount to confessing that he was giving Martoma inside
information.”141
All of Martoma’s defenses were rejected at trial.142 The district judge described the argument
asserting Dr. Gilman did not receive a personal benefit and Martoma was not aware Dr. Gilman received a
personal benefit as “meritless.”143 The court stated Martoma knew Dr. Gilman was getting paid for the
consultations and was “well aware” Dr. Gilman did not meet with him 43 times “out of the goodness of his
heart.”144 The court cited ample evidence of a direct benefit suggesting a quid pro quo exchange in its opinion
convicting Martoma.145
In his appeal to the Second Circuit, Martoma challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented at
trial and the adequacy of the trial court’s jury instruction.146 Judge Katzman, writing for the majority, rejected
the sufficiency of evidence claim in less than 300 words by explaining a quid pro quo relationship can be
established by an ongoing exchange-based relationship like the one shared by Martoma and Dr. Gilman.147
The remainder of the majority opinion addressed the challenge to the district court’s jury instruction.148
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Martoma’s jury instruction challenge claimed the jury was not adequately instructed on the
“meaningful close personal relationship” requirement created in Newman.149 The court rejected that
argument claiming the “meaningful close personal relationship requirement” was overruled by Salman.150
The majority stated the Dirks court suggested that benefits from quid pro quo relationships and gifts to trading
“relatives or friends” are examples of circumstances warranting inferring a personal benefit, not the basis for
a test.151 Judge Katzman then compared Newman’s holding that a jury cannot infer a tipper personally
benefited from a gift unless the gift was to someone with whom the tipper shared “a meaningfully close
relationship with,” to Dirks.152 Acknowledging that the “meaningfully close relationship” requirement in
Newman was meant to clarify the “friend” language in Dirks, Judge Katzman maintained the requirement
was improper, claiming Dirks did not intend to limit inferring a personal benefit to gifting friends or family
members.153 Judge Katzman stated Dirks intended to allow inferring a personal benefit when material
nonpublic information is gifted, regardless of the identity of the recipient.154 The judge supported that
statement by saying Dirks’ justification for finding that tippers derive a personal benefit from gifting
information to friends or relatives is that “[t]he tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed
by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”155 Then, claiming support from the “doubt casted” in Salman, the
majority three-judge panel overruled Newman by explicitly stating the “meaningfully close personal
relationship requirement is no longer good law.”156
Judge Katzman claimed that although Dirks and Salman’s discussions of gifts was limited to “trading
relative[s] and friend[s],” the logic behind Dirks, reaffirmed by Salman, is that an insider personally benefits
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whenever he “disclose[s] information as a gift . . . with the expectation [the recipient would trade] on that
information because “such a disclosure is the functional equivalent of trading on the information himself and
giving a cash gift to the recipient.”157 The majority stated the Supreme Court’s statement in Salman that an
insider benefits by “giv[ing] such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the
information for their personal gain” was not limited by the relationships of the parties.158 The Martoma
majority held that an insider benefits from disclosing inside information if the information was disclosed “with
the expectation that [the recipient] would trade on it,” and the disclosure “resemble[s] trading by the insider
followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient,” whether the tipper and tippee share a “meaningfully close
personal relationship” or not.159 Judge Katzman justified this interpretation by claiming it does not eliminate
the personal benefit rule because Dirks intended to allow an inferred personal benefit whenever inside
information is disclosed “with the expectation that [the recipient] would trade on it.”160 Ultimately, the
majority affirmed Martoma’s conviction after finding there was sufficient evidence of a personal benefit and
the district court’s jury instruction was not clearly erroneous to affect the outcome of the trial.161
D.

Circuit Judge Pooler’s Dissent in Martoma v. United States
The Martoma majority’s opinion prompted a lengthy dissent by Circuit Judge Pooler.162 Judge

Pooler stated that the majority’s holding, allowing an inferred personal benefit anytime an insider gifts inside
information, effectively strips the personal benefit rule of its limiting power.163 The dissent provided a
summary of the evolution of personal benefit rule and the recent developments in light of Newman and
Salman.164 Judge Pooler then detailed the changes made by the majority’s decision.165
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A major problem Judge Pooler found with the majority’s opinion was its failure to provide guidance
for distinguishing a “gift” from a non-gift disclosure.166 Judge Pooler found removing the friend and family
requirement leaves it up to the jury to arbitrarily and subjectively decide when the disclosure of nonpublic
material information constitutes a gift.167 The dissent points out the majority’s claim that information is a
“gift” when the tipper expects the tippee to trade on the information is meaningless.168 The tipper having
knowledge the tippee would trade on the inside information is already an established component of the test
for determining tipper-tippee liability, so holding it out as grounds to infer a benefit upon the insider is both
redundant and provides no limitation.169 Eliminating the limitation, as Judge Pooler stated, was not adopted
by Salman.170 Further, the Salman court explicitly considered that view, offered by the government to convict
Salman and now held by the Martoma majority, without adopting it.171 Judge Pooler would have accordingly
held that (1) Salman did not overrule Newman’s “meaningfully close personal relationship” requirement, and
(2) Salman does not overrule the limitation from Dirks that restricts inferring a personal benefit to an insider’s
gifts to relatives or friends.172
E.

Response to the Second Circuit’s Majority Opinion in Martoma
After the Second Circuit decided Martoma, the consensus was the majority’s opinion made

prosecuting tipper-tippee insider trading cases significantly easier.173 It is clear the majority’s adaptation of
Dirk’s personal benefit rule reduced the circumstances the government must prove to infer a tipper received
a personal benefit. This comment now consider the language used in Judge Katzman’s majority opinion,
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defending the reduction, to determine if Dirks and Salman really support the interpretation held by the
Martoma court.
To determine if Salman warrants Judge Katzman’s overruling of the “meaningfully close personal
relationship” standard from Newman, we must first look to the language used in Salman’s majority opinion.
Throughout the Salman majority opinion, Justice Alito defined the issue at bar as “narrow” and the application
of Dirks it invited as “precise.”174 When Justice Alito held a portion of Newman inconsistent with Dirks, he
clarified it was only inconsistent “to the extent” that it required “something of a pecuniary or similarly valuable
nature in exchange for a gift to family or friends.”175 Also relevant are Justice Alito’s attempts to frame the
closeness of the relationship between the tipper and the tippee. Justice Alito explicitly included significant
evidence explaining how close Michael and Maher were by noting Michael was the best man at Maher’s
wedding, and Maher “love[d] [his] brother very much.”176 Despite this, the Martoma majority construed
Salman’s opinion to hold that the relationship between a tipper and tippee is irrelevant when determining
whether the tipper received a personal benefit by sharing insider information.
When making the assertion Salman nullified the “meaningfully close personal relationship” and the
trading relative or friend requirement, the Second Circuit majority provided a quote from Salman as the basis
of its claim.177 The quote from Salman implied that one can infer a personal benefit if the tip “resembles
trading by the insider followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”178 The Martoma majority failed to
include the two sentences surrounding that quote to put it in the context Judge Alito used it in.179 The full
excerpt from Salman that the Martoma claims justified their holding reads:
This Court adheres to the holding in Dirks, which easily resolves the case at hand: “when an insider
makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend . . . [t]he tip and trade resemble
174
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trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.” In these situations, the
tipper personally benefits because giving a gift of trading information to a trading relative is the same
thing as trading by the tipper followed by a gift of the proceeds.180
When looking at the sentences surrounding Justice Alito’s comments regarding a tip “resembling a
trade by the insider followed by a gift of the profits,” it becomes apparent that Justice Alito’s description was
in the context of a gift to a trading relative or friend. By removing the context, the Martoma court used a small
piece of Justice Alito’s explanation to support a conflicting position. Considering this context, and the
numerous attempts by Justice Alito to label the Salman decision a narrow one,181 it is difficult to understand
how the Second Circuit interpreted the holding to allow inferring a benefit in all instances of gifting insider
information.182
The Martoma dissent agreed that overruling Newman was not supported by Salman, but the entire
dissent was not entirely agreeable. Judge Pooler found that the jury instruction’s failure to instruct the jury on
Newman affected the outcome of Martoma’s case.183 Considering the personal benefit subject to the
Martoma decision derived from ample evidence of a quid pro quo exchange, it is hard to see how a failure to
instruct the jury on the types of relationships that allow an inferred benefit in the absence of a quid pro quo
exchange would affect the outcome of the case.
The dissent was first of a plethora of criticisms of the Martoma majority’s decision. For the time
being, the holding is precedent in the Second Circuit: the personal benefit requirement for tipper-tippee insider
trading liability may be inferred when an insider gifts nonpublic material information, regardless of who the
recipient is. Although Judge Pooler’s opinion failed to win over a majority of Second Circuit judges,
commentary following the decision suggests many legal scholars agree with the dissent’s interpretation of the
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law.184 The decision was universally understood to have significantly broadened insider trading liability and
tipped the scales back in the government’s favor after Newman, an arguably desirable result on its face. The
issue is that if Newman was a brick on the scale, weighing in favor of the defendant, Martoma is a boulder on
the government’s side, placed there without procedural or substantive justification.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Martoma was procedurally unsound because the court failed to
follow the rule of interpanel accord in completely overruling Newman. The rule of interpanel accord holds
that a circuit court decision is binding over the circuit that made it, any district within that circuit, and may be
overruled only if: (1) a subsequent inconsistent decision by the Supreme Court requires its modification, or;
(2) the circuit court sits en banc to overrule the prior decision.185
Here, because the Second Circuit did not hear Martoma en banc, the only way to properly overrule
Newman would have required a subsequent inconsistent Supreme Court decision.186 The Second Circuit
majority cites Salman for this purpose.187 The problem with using Salman to justify overruling the
relationship requirement when gifting inside information is that the Supreme Court did no such thing in
deciding Salman.188 Yes, the Supreme Court overruled the requirement of a benefit with “pecuniary or
similarly valuable nature” in exchange for a gift to family or friends, but the Salman decision did not remove
the relationship requirement all together.189 Despite Salman’s limited holding, explicitly overruling Newman
in part, the Martoma majority interpreted the decision as justification for overruling Newman in its entirety.
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This interpretation is unfaithful to the logic of Salman and conflicts with the foundational principles
established in Dirks.190 Using Salman to avoid an en banc hearing to overrule Newman is inconsistent with
procedural requirements and undermines the institution of respecting precedents. Invalidating the relationship
requirement in gifting situations was substantively unjustified for the same reason avoiding an en banc hearing
was procedurally unjustified; the Salman decision simply did not strike down the relationship requirement
like the Martoma majority purports it did.
V.

Looking Forward: Options for Recalibrating the Scope of Insider Trading Liability
Two months after Martoma was decided, Michael Martoma filed a petition to have his case reheard

en banc. In addition to Martoma’s petition, an amicus curiae brief seeking the same was filed by respected
law professors and practitioners. The amicus brief, signed by University of California, Berkeley professor
Alan Schoenfeld and endorsed by ten experts in the field, petitioned for a hearing en banc because: (1) the
panel opinion conflicts Supreme Court precedent by expanding the gift theory to apply to any tippee; (2) the
panel decision conflicts with Supreme Court precedent by effectively negating the personal benefit
requirement, and; (3) the vague standard in the panel’s holding will create expansive criminal liability.191
Granting the above mentioned the amicus brief would be the quickest and least invasive way for the Second
Circuit to revisit its decision, but there are doubts as to whether the Second Circuit will grant the request. One
reason an en banc rehearing is unlikely is because Martoma’s majority was written by Judge Katzman, the
current Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, and only two Judges from the Newman panel currently maintain
active status.192 Another reason an en banc rehearing is unlikely is due to how rare the Second Circuit grants
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them; the Second Circuit granted only two en banc hearings between 2011–2016, the least of any circuit in
the country.193
Another option besides an en banc hearing is for the Supreme Court to hear the case. This option is
also unlikely due to the Supreme Court’s tendency to let circuit splits develop before ruling on contentious
issues. This, coupled with how recently the Supreme Court decided Salman, weighs strongly against
Martoma reaching the country’s highest court any time soon.
A third option for clarifying the prosecution standard for tipper-tippee insider trading liability would
be for the legislature to get involved and create a standard by statute. A statutory scheme memorializing the
insider trading case law that has been developed over the last century would provide lasting clarity and help
ensure consistency in future cases. This option, despite being the best available, is the most unlikely. The
SEC has avoided promulgating regulations regarding insider trading in order to allow broad interpretations of
Rule 10b-5, and to avoid creating a blue print for sophisticated investors to commit fraud while staying within
the bounds of the law. Although the above options do not seem likely based on the current political climate194
and the Second Circuit’s historical mode of operating, something needs to be done to avoid significant
consequences resulting from the current state of the law, as per Martoma.
VI.

Conclusion
There has been constant tension between the government and federal courts throughout the

development of American insider trading laws. The Martoma decision signals that tension will not be
resolved any time soon. The government is consistently pushing to expand the standard for insider trading
liability while the courts push back. As illustrated above, the decision in Newman unduly tilted the standard

193

Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, The Rarity of En Banc Review in the Second Circuit; Second Circuit Review, N.Y. L. J.,
Aug. 23, 2016.
194
Donald Trump has had difficulty passing major legislation during his presidency and this issue is not currently a top priority. See
Kevin Breuninger, Trump Keeps Calling for Major Legislation, but Congress Isn’t Listening – Especially With Midterms Coming,
CNBC (April 3, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/03/trump-congress-dont-expect-big-legislation-in-2018.html.

27

in favor of defendants and made it significantly more difficult for the government to sustain an insider trading
conviction. The Salman court attempted to resolve the controversy created by Newman and offered an
interpretation of the Dirks test consistent with the original standard created by Justice Powell. Unfortunately,
the Martroma decision negated all the clarity that Salman provided. The Second Circuit’s decision in
Martoma attempted to restore the balance that was disrupted by Newman and tilted the standard unduly in the
prosecutions favor.
The inconsistency in the application of Dirks, even after the Supreme Court’s attempt to provide
clarity, needs to be permanently rectified. The Second Circuit was not justified in overruling Newman by a
three-judge panel because the alleged doubt created by Salman, that the judges relied upon, did not exist. The
Salman majority overruled the portion of Newman that went too far in the defendant’s favor but did not
provide the basis for overruling the relationship requirement as the Martoma panel held it did. The Second
Circuit should, but probably will not, grant Mr. Martoma’s October 2017 request to rehear his case en banc
in order to clarify the applicable standard reaffirmed by Salman. Although rehearing the case is unlikely to
change the outcome for Mr. Martoma, it would provide the Second Circuit with an opportunity to eliminate
the vagueness the current standard creates. Further, the consistent misapplication of the standard for insider
trading liability has persisted long enough that the government should step in to provide statutory guidelines.
The judge-made standard derived from Rule 10b-5 has proven too uncertain for multiple decades, and the
legislature needs to provide courts with clear guidelines to govern future cases.
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